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6
AG EN C Y O F R I SK : T H E CO M P E T IN G B A L A N C E B E T W EEN
P R O T E C T IN G M I L I TA R Y F O R C E S A N D T H E C I V IL I A N
P O P U L AT IO N D U R IN G CO U N T ER IN S U R G EN C Y
O P ER AT IO N S IN A F G H A N I S TA N 1
Chris Jenks2

Introduction
Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their Soldiers and Marines by sending them
into harm’s way to accomplish the mission. At the same time, leaders attempt to avoid, at great
length, injury and death to innocents. Th is requirement gets to the very essence of what some
describe as “the burden of command.” . . . Ultimate success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is
gained by protecting the populace, not the [military] force. . . . [yet] combatants are not required to
take so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives.3

In 2010, nine years into Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, casualties among
both Afghan civilians and members of the U.S. military were at their highest levels to
date. Taliban4 insurgents employing suicide and improvised explosive devices directly
caused the vast majority of those casualties. Yet attitudes and perceptions among both
the Afghan population and the U.S. military reflect differing conceptions of blame and
responsibility. Afghans blame the mere presence of the United States as the underlying
cause for Taliban attacks and resulting civilian casualties, while members of the U.S.
military question whether self-imposed limitations on employing force has led to
increasing numbers of U.S. service members wounded and killed.
108
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One of the origins of this angst is the degree and manner by which risk is borne by the
two groups, Afghan civilian and U.S. military, as a result of the ongoing counterinsurgency
operations. At the strategic level, military doctrine, including the language in the
quotation above from the U.S. military’s 2006 counterinsurgency manual, provides
fundamental principles that govern the conduct of military operations and, in so doing,
shapes the parameters of this risk. Moving from the strategic level through the chain
of command to the tactical level, the soldier and marine on the ground, the contours
of risk are operationalized through the war-fighting command promulgating rules of
engagement and, in Afghanistan, the tactical directive.
The tactical directive “provides guidance and intent for the use of force by” U.S. and
coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan.5 Previously classified to protect the
force and still classified in parts, beginning in 2008 three successive commanders of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have made portions of
the directive public.
The 2008 tactical directive stressed minimizing death or injury of innocent civilians
and reinforced the idea of proportionality, “requisite restraint, and the utmost
discrimination in our application of firepower.”6 This iteration, however, did n0t place
any specific limitations on the certain types of force, relying instead on “[g]ood tactical
judgment” to minimize civilian casualties.7 In contrast, the 2009 directive dictated that
“use of air-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only
authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions . . . ”8
The 2009 tactical directive “de-emphasized airstrikes, artillery and mortars. This
transferred some of the risk in skirmishes from Afghan civilians to Western combatants.
In the past, American patrols in contact often quickly called for and received fire
support. Not anymore. Many firefights are strictly rifle and machine gun fights.”9 In
accordance with this perspective, in not providing the fire support that otherwise may
be available, the tactical directive increased engagement times with the enemy, which in
turn heightened the risk to troops on the ground. The resulting concern of some U.S.
service members wasn’t so much that the tactical directive transferred risks away from
the civilians to the U.S. military, but that it transferred risk away from the enemy.10 Yet,
a 2010 review of the tactical directive “found no evidence that the rules restricted the use
of lifesaving firepower” or even “a single situation where a soldier has lost his life because
he was not allowed to protect himself.”11
At first blush, the current iteration of the tactical directive, which General
David Petraeus issued in 2010, differs only slightly from the 2009 version. And
those differences seem little more than an alternatively worded means to the same
conceptual end—the importance of protecting the Afghan population. But the 2010
tactical directive seemingly alters the risk relationship and balance between Afghan
civilians and the U.S. military. The 2009 directive expressly acknowledged that “the
carefully controlled and disciplined use of force entails risk to our troops,” recognizing
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that protecting the force must, on some level and at some times, be subordinate to
protecting the civilian population. In partial yet profound contrast, the 2010 tactical
directive lists protecting Afghan civilians and the men and women in uniform as
coequal moral imperatives.
Utilizing both the tactical directive and doctrinal concepts from the counterinsurgency
manual, this chapter will explore the allocation of risk between the military force and
Afghan civilian population. The chapter first reviews civilian and military casualty
figures and then uses those numbers as a touchstone against which to consider each
group’s perception of the risk they face.
To set the conditions for that comparison, the chapter discusses the allocation of
risk outlined in recent counterinsurgency doctrine and how that allocation translates
from the conceptual or strategic level to the operational reality of soldiers and marines
in harm’s way at the tactical level. This chapter examines whether that translation is
conceptually consistent and tactically viable.
While the concept of the U.S. military accepting increased risk in order to protect
the civilian population is codified as doctrine, how well is the military translating,
and training, that doctrine? As one commentator stated, “[n]o one wants to advocate
loosening rules that might see more civilians killed. But no one wants to explain
whether the restrictions are increasing the number of coffins arriving at Dover Air Force
Base, and seeding disillusionment among those sent to fight.”12 This chapter seeks not to
provide that explanation but to prompt a discussion on whether there is consistency in
risk tolerance between U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine and the execution of
that doctrine at the tactical level in Afghanistan.
I. Civilian and Military Casualties and Their Causes 13
A. Civilian Casualties
According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 2,777 civilians
were killed in 2010 as a result of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, a 15 percent
increase from 2009.14 This follows a four-year trend in which each year more civilians
were killed in Afghanistan than the year prior.15 In terms of wounded civilians,
UNAMA documented 4,343 conflict-related injuries in 2010, a 22 percent increase
from 2009.16
While the total number of civilian casualties has been increasing, in both 2009 and
2010 the percentage of civilian casualties caused by pro-government forces (including
the Afghan, U.S., and coalition militaries) decreased.17 In 2010, UNAMA claimed that
pro-government forces were responsible for 440 civilian deaths or 16 percent of the
total, a 26 percent decrease from 2009.18 Pro-government forces were also purportedly
responsible for 400 civilian injuries or 9 percent of the total, a 13 percent decrease from
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2009.19 In terms of the manner by which Afghans are wounded or killed by coalition
forces, UNAMA stated that “[a]erial attacks claimed the largest percentage of civilian
deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces in 2010, causing 171 deaths (39 percent of the
total number of civilian deaths attributed to Pro-Government Forces).”20 However,
that figure represents a 52 percent decrease in Afghan civilian fatalities stemming from
coalition air strikes from 2009.21
Conversely, anti-government elements, such as the Taliban, were responsible for
2,080 deaths in 2010 or 75 percent of the total civilian deaths, a 28 percent increase from
2009.22 This continues, and widens, the trend recognized by UNAMA in 2009, that
“more civilians are being killed by AGEs than by PGF.”23 Anti-government elements
injured some 3,366 civilians or 78 percent of the total, a 21 percent increase from 2009.
Anti-government element suicide and improvised explosive device attacks caused the
greatest overall number of killed and wounded Afghan civilians.24
B. U.S. Military Casualties
Not until 2008 did U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan exceed 30,000.25 But by November
2009, there were 68,000 troops in Afghanistan and roughly 100,000 by mid-2010. Such
variance either skews quantitative comparison, or at a minimum renders statistical
analysis of U.S. casualty rates over time beyond the scope of this chapter. Accordingly,
this section will refer to U.S. casualty data from only 2010 to provide a frame of reference
and comparison and not as the basis for empirical analysis.
In 2010, 499 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan.26 Improvised explosive devices
were responsible for 268 of those fatalities, or roughly 54 percent.27 In terms of injuries,
5,173 U.S. service members were wounded in Afghanistan in 2010.28
C. Casualty Comparison
2010 Afghanistan Casualty Comparison
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Using 2010 for comparison purposes, and speaking only in total numbers and ratios, more
U.S. forces were wounded, 5,173, than the total number of Afghan civilians wounded,
4,343. Within that total number, the United Nations claims that U.S. and coalition forces
were responsible for wounding 400 Afghan civilians. Thus, U.S. forces were wounded
almost eleven times for every one instance when they wounded an Afghan civilian.
But the fatalities discussion is almost flipped. In 2010, 2,412 Afghan civilians were
killed compared to 499 U.S. service members.29 Within that total number, the United
Nations claims that U.S. and coalition forces were responsible for the deaths of 440
Afghan civilians. Thus, U.S. forces were killed at roughly the same ratio by which they
killed Afghan civilians.30

Agency of Risk

113

That comparison provides a reference point for a normative discussion on how the two sides,
Afghan civilian and U.S. military, perceive the risk that the casualty rates depict, the extent
to which those perceptions are consistent with the numerical indicia of risk, and ultimately
how that impacts the overall counterinsurgency effort. From the perspective of the U.S.
military, examining U.S. service member perceptions of risk requires first briefly reviewing
the modern doctrine by which the United States purports to conduct counterinsurgency
campaigns, filtered through the ISAF and actualized through the tactical directive.
D. U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Doctrine
In 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps filled a doctrinal gap that spanned two decades
or more by issuing a publication exclusively devoted to counterinsurgency operations,
the type of armed conflict soldiers and marines were—and are—fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan.31 The publication provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency
(COIN) operations, including lessons learned thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan and those
learned and to some extent forgotten, or at least neglected, from Vietnam.
The doctrine details a variety of guidance on the risk relationship between military
forces and the civilian population, including the following:
•
•

•

•

“The military forces’ primary function in COIN is protecting the populace.”32
“The importance of protecting the populace, gaining people’s support by
assisting them, and using measured force when fighting insurgents should be
reinforced and understood.”33
“In conventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission
accomplishment with protection of noncombatants is difficult enough. Complex
COIN operations place the toughest of ethical demands on Soldiers, Marines,
and their leaders.”34
“Limiting the misery caused by war requires combatants to consider certain
rules, principles, and consequences that restrain the amount of force they may
apply. At the same time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that
they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives. As long as their use of force is
proportional to the gain to be achieved and discriminates in distinguishing
between combatants and noncombatants. Soldiers and Marines may take actions
where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm to noncombatants.”35

The doctrine also identifies paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations, including:
•
•
•

•

“Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.”36
“Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.”37
“The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the
more risk must be accepted.”38
“Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.”39
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The doctrinal guidance on the use of force in a counterinsurgency is markedly different
than in conventional armed conflicts where the focus is to “concentrate the effects of
combat power at the decisive place and time.”40
The counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance is then fi ltered through the International
Security Assistance Force mission, which is
[i]n support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF
conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the
insurgency, support the growth in capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces,
and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in
order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to
the population.41
The question then becomes: how should the United States reduce the capability and
will of the insurgency? And the answer is both through offensive or kinetic operations
as well as through denying the insurgency the ability to operate by improving
governance and socioeconomic development. Protecting the civilian population is
inextricably linked to both. The tactical directive provides the means, or parameters
on force as a means, to accomplishing the mission, shaped by the counterinsurgency
doctrine.
II. Tactical Dir ective
After revising the tactical directive in the summer of 2009, General Stanley McChrystal
made portions public “to ensure a broader awareness of the intent and scope” of his
guidance to the force.42 While there had always been limitations on the use of force
by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and at least one prior version of the tactical
directive released to the media, General McChrystal’s modifications sparked discussion
and controversy, much of which has continued and remained not just unresolved but
unaddressed by the U.S. military.43
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, contrary to his predecessor, General
McChrystal allowed the use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires under “very
limited and prescribed conditions.” In his iteration of the directive, General McChrystal
acknowledged the implicit trade-off inherent in limiting the use of force at the tactical
level in support of the broader strategic goal of Afghan civilian support.
We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat
the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of
Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of
gravity—the people. That means we must respect and protect the population from
coercion and violence—and operate in a manner which will win their support.
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This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine
the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of
enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering
strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus
alienating the people.
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational
issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either
side in this struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat
ourselves.
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails
risk to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But
excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater
risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.44
Some U.S. service members were critical of the 2009 tactical directive. As a junior U.S.
Army officer in Afghanistan queried:
[m]inimizing civilian casualties is a fine goal, but should it be the be-all and end-all
of the policy? If we allow soldiers to die in Afghanistan at the hands of a leader who
says, “We’re going to protect civilians rather than soldiers’ what’s going to happen
on the ground? The soldiers are not going to execute the mission to the best of their
ability. They won’t put their hearts into the mission. That’s the kind of atmosphere
we’re building.”45
One noncommissioned officer sent an e-mail to a member of the U.S. Congress
complaining that the rules of engagement (ROE) which flowed from the tactical directive
were “too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success.”46 Another
noncommissioned officer commented to a reporter that he “wish[ed] we had generals
who remembered what it was like when they were down in a platoon. . . . Either they have
never been in real fighting, or they forgot what it’s like.”47 One news story quoted U.S.
service members in Afghanistan as complaining that the tactical directive “handcuffed”
them.
The directive’s limitations on the employment of indirect fire and close air support
received much of the frontline criticism. One marine infantry officer said he had
stopped requesting air support during ground engagements as the approval process
was too time consuming and tethered him to a radio. Moreover, the officer claimed
that air support didn’t arrive, was late when it did arrive, or that pilots were hesitant to
conduct the requested air strike of ground targets. Alternatively, some units describe
“decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out into the open to
draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fight.”48
While those are perhaps anecdotal and isolated examples, they occurred within a time
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frame in which both U.S. military and Afghan civilian casualty rates increased. And
while at the same time the percentage of Afghan casualties caused by the U.S. military
significantly decreased, there does not appear to have been a corresponding increase
in Afghan civilian perceptions of safety, security, and the legitimacy and utility of the
U.S. military presence in their country. From the Afghan civilian perspective, that
the casualty-producing entity is predominantly the Taliban is little comfort and does
not constitute protection. From the U.S. service member perspective, if the Afghan
civilians refuse to place blame for civilian casualties on the entity actually causing them,
and the only real beneficiaries of U.S. restraint are the enemy, then why should those
service members accept more risk?
The criticism of the tactical directive seemed to reach its zenith in the spring and
summer of 2010. In the spring came word of an ISAF proposal to award a medal to
U.S. service members for “courageous restraint for holding fire to save civilian lives.”49
According to an ISAF statement: “[w]e routinely and systematically recognize valor,
courage and effectiveness during kinetic combat operations. . . . In a COIN campaign,
however, it is critical to also recognize that sometimes the most effective bullet is the
bullet not fired.”50 As one story noted, “[a] combat medal to recognize a conscious effort
to avoid a combat action would be unique.”51 The courageous restraint effort, which
would seemingly recognize the tactical application of some of the counterinsurgency
doctrinal points listed above, was short lived.
By the summer, one U.S. Army colonel claimed the troops “hated” the tactical directive
and that “right now we’re losing the tactical-level fight in the chase for a strategic victory.”52
At this point and unrelated to the tactical directive, General McChrystal resigned as the
ISAF commander.53 But the tactical directive loomed large in the interim while General
Petraeus was awaiting confirmation to succeed General McChrystal. At his confirmation
hearing, General Petraeus submitted an opening statement acknowledging that some
U.S. service members were concerned over the tactical directive:
Our efforts in Afghanistan have appropriately focused on protecting the population.
This is, needless to say, of considerable importance, for in counterinsurgency
operations, the human terrain is the decisive terrain. The results in recent months have
been notable. Indeed, over the last 12 weeks, the number of innocent civilians killed
in the course of military operations has been substantially lower than it was during
the same period last year. And I will continue the emphasis on reducing the loss of
innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the course of military operations.
Focusing on securing the people does not, however, mean that we don’t go after
the enemy; in fact, protecting the population inevitably requires killing, capturing,
or turning the insurgents. Our forces have been doing that, and we will continue to
do that. In fact, our troopers and our Afghan partners have been very much taking
the fight to the enemy. Since the beginning of April alone, more than 130 middle
and upper-level Taliban and other extremist element leaders have been killed or
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captured, and thousands of their rank and fi le have been taken off the battlefield.
Together with our Afghan counterparts, we will continue to pursue relentlessly
the enemies of the new Afghanistan in the months and years ahead.
On a related note, I want to assure the mothers and fathers of those fighting in
Afghanistan that I see it as a moral imperative to bring all assets to bear to protect
our men and women in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom ISAF
troopers are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder. Those on the ground must have all the
support they need when they are in a tough situation. This is so important that
I have discussed it with President Karzai, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, and
Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Kahn since my nomination to be COMISAF,
and they are in full agreement with me on it. I mention this because I am keenly
aware of concerns by some of our troopers on the ground about the application of
our rules of engagement and the tactical directive. They should know that I will
look very hard at this issue.54
In early August 2010, General Petraeus issued an updated tactical directive. In the
first paragraph of the revised directive, General Petraeus cautioned that “[s]ubordinate
commanders are not authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.”
This requirement sought to address concerns that the issue with the tactical directive
under General McChrystal was not so much the limitations he imposed, but that those
limitations were a floor, not a ceiling, and that several layers of command between ISAF
and a U.S. Army or Marine Corps unit in contact were adding additional restrictions
or requirements.
But contrary to General McChrystal’s express acknowledgment of the limitations on
the use of force equating to increased risk for U.S. service members, General Petraeus’s
version placed protecting Afghan civilians and the force on the same level.
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimize loss of
innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces
have been striving to do that, and we will continue to do so.
In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a moral imperative both to protect
Afghan civilians and to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women in uniform
and the Afghan security forces with whom we are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder when
they are in a tough spot.55
This language seems, if not inconsistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, an
avoidance or obfuscation of the subordinate relationship between protecting the force
and the civilian population which the doctrine emphasizes and the harsh consequences
that flow from that subordination during use-of-force situations.
Yet, the current tactical directive is not receiving as much open criticism as its
predecessor, at least from U.S. service members. Its impact on the “hearts and minds”
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of the population is unclear though. Despite the report that in the third quarter of
calendar year 2010 anti-government elements caused 90 percent of Afghan civilian
deaths and injuries, in the minds of many Afghans the true cause of the casualties was
ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan.56
Even with the changed wording the tactical directive emphasizing protecting civilians,
those civilians feel, or think, otherwise. This is apparently due in part to continuing
challenges ISAF faces in strategic communications—a 2010 poll revealed that 40 percent
of those interviewed believed ISAF was in Afghanistan “to destroy Islam or to occupy or
destroy the country.” Additionally, “only 8 percent of interviewees in the south knew the
story of the 9/11 attacks and as a result had no understanding of the justification for the
conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda.”57 Further supporting an argument that Afghan
perceptions of their safety and future in Afghanistan are not positive, beginning in 2008
and continuing through 2010, more Afghans were seeking asylum in foreign countries
than at any point since the 2001 U.S. invasion.
As one commentator aptly noted, “[a]n American counterinsurgency campaign seeks
support from at least two publics—the Afghan and the American. Efforts to satisfy one
can undermine support in the other.”58 Overt, or at least publicized, U.S. military criticism
of the current directive seems to have abated. But is that indicative of greater acceptance of
the implicit risk trade-offs the directive represents? A lesser dislike of the current directive’s
requirements than those in prior versions? Or is the absence of overt comment simply
masking continued divergence between doctrinal counterinsurgency guidance and tactical
realities on the ground? General McChrystal subordinated the military to the civilian
population in terms of risk allocation. General Petraeus seemed to consider them coequal.
What then of the U.S. Army platoon leader who, prior to leading his soldiers on patrol in
Afghanistan, told them, “[w]e are going to go up there and take care of each other. That
is going to be our number one priority.”59 Thus, at the same point in time the operational
commander considered protecting the military and civilian population equally important
while the tactical leader on the ground considered force protection more important. The
first needed step is to recognize this cognitive dissonance. From there, the task becomes
reassessing how the U.S. military operationalizes counterinsurgency doctrine.
III. Tr anslating and Tr aining Doctr ine
The counterinsurgency doctrine lays out competing interests, protection of the force
and of the civilian population. On the one hand, the doctrine claims that “ultimate
success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is gained by protecting the populace, not
the [military] force”60 while “[a]t the same time, combatants are not required to take so
much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives.”61
The U.S. military acknowledges that “[e]thically speaking, COIN environments can
be much more complex than conventional ones” and that “[t]he fortitude to see Soldiers
and Marines closing with the enemy and sustaining casualties day in and day out requires
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resolve and mental toughness in commanders and units. Leaders must develop these
characteristics in peacetime through study and hard training. They must maintain them
in combat.”62
There have now been three iterations of how doctrinal concepts of risk allocation in
counterinsurgency are implemented through the tactical directive and a wide range of
service member responses. There are a few lingering questions regarding the evolution
of this doctrine, primarily: Are the implications of this tactical directive conceptually
consistent with doctrine, and has the military discussed the ethics of risk allocation
necessary to conduct counterinsurgency operations?
The service member complaints about the tactical directive and the short-lived nature
of the courageous restraint medal suggest a disconnect between doctrine and practice.
What kind of discussions is the military fostering through its professional military
education and other training? The U.S. Army’s Center for the Army Profession and
Ethic (CAPE) provides one example.63 One of the CAPE training vignettes involves
a new platoon leader who overhears one of his noncommissioned officers telling the
soldiers in the platoon that protecting each other, that ensuring every member of
the platoon returns home uninjured, is their mission. While the vignette sets the
conditions for the very discussions this chapter suggests, CAPE training is relatively
new, is not widespread, and, more important, not required. One commentator, a U.S.
Army officer who served as a platoon leader in Afghanistan, recently wrote in Army
Magazine that the lack of operationally contextualized ethics training amounted to a
structural weakness.64 The officer claimed that “we need to begin shaping a different
future with a community conversation about ethics, anger and how best to prepare
ourselves for war.”65
That U.S. service members are in harm’s way in Afghanistan and are also trying to
protect the civilian population is implicitly understood—within the military. Outside
that group, there is a perception that the military has shifted the risks of war to contractors
and that Americans on the whole are indifferent to foreign national civilian casualties.66
But is there an explicit training component in place that will ensure all service members
in the U.S. military have a shared understanding when doctrine espouses the dichotomy
that “[u]ltimate success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is gained by protecting the
populace, not the [military] force, . . . [yet] combatants are not required to take so much
risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives?”67
The U.S. military inculcates its service members with the concepts of selfless service
and duty, among other values.68 The military ethos at its core focuses on service members
looking for the safety and welfare of their fellow service member—the proverbial,
but in combat literal, soldier or marine on your left and right. While that focus is
understandable and even commendable, without frank and candid discussions on
where and how risk is apportioned and accepted in counterinsurgency operations, is the
military unintentionally sowing the seeds of dissonance?

appendix 1

2008 Tactical Directive—General McKiernan
1. We are here to win and that victory is an Afghan victory; a victory which creates
a secure population which enjoys freedom of movement, effective governance, viable
institutions, and economic progress. We must always keep in mind that what we do and
how we do it must support the Afghan people and the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan (GIRoA). We must continue to take the fight to the enemy in partnership
with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency and provide security to the population. The way
we act, the techniques we use, and the means we employ must serve to protect and defend
the Afghan public and reinforce their confidence in GIRoA and the forces fighting on their
behalf. We will take a comprehensive approach wherein ISAF operates in a complementary
way with GIRoA and the ANSF. With that as background, I direct as follows:
2. The support of the Afghan people for the GIRoA and their collective support for
ISAF are critical to defeating the insurgency we are fighting. We have that public support at
the national level. We cannot take it for granted and must strive to deepen and broaden it.
3. We must partner and conduct combined operations with Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) in support of Afghan objectives to the maximum extent possible. ISAF
independent operations must be the exception.
4. Our actions both on and off the battlefield are important to our success. We must
maintain our professionalism at all times, and always keep in mind the consequences
of our actions. Respect for the Afghan people, their culture, their religion, and their
customs is essential:
a. Unless there is a clear and identified danger emanating from a building and to do
otherwise would threaten our ANSF partners and ourselves, all searches and entries
of Afghan homes, mosques, religious sites or places of cultural significance will be
led by ANSF. All responses must be proportionate and the utmost of care should be
taken to minimize any damage.
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b. All personnel will demonstrate respect for Afghans, Afghan culture, Afghan
customs, and Islam in their actions and words. On the road and in vehicles, ISAF
personnel will demonstrate respect and consideration for Afghan traffic and
pedestrians.
c. In order to minimize death or injury of innocent civilians in escalation of force
engagements, Commanders are to set conditions through the employment of
techniques and procedures and, most importantly, the training of forces to minimize
the need to resort to deadly force. Signals, signs, general and specific warnings (visual
and audible) must be unambiguous and repeated to ensure the safety of innocent
civilians.

5. We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in an extremely demanding environment.
We are fighting an enemy that often cannot be identified before he has struck and then
once he has, he hides among the civilian population. The battle is often waged among
civilians and their property. We must clearly apply and demonstrate proportionality,
requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in our application of firepower. No
one seeks or intends to constrain the inherent right of self defense of every member of
the ISAF force. However, Commanders must focus upon the principles which attach
to every use of force—be that self defense or offensive fires. Good tactical judgment,
necessity, and proportionality are to drive every action and engagement; minimizing
civilian casualties is of paramount importance.
6. Whenever we believe we may have caused civilian casualties or civilian property
damage we will immediately investigate the incident. If it is determined ISAF caused
those casualties or that damage, ISAF will immediately acknowledge that fact.
Acknowledgement by media, key leader engagement, by shura or other means, must
happen at each level of command as appropriate. There must be a battle drill in place at
each tactical level of the organization, and all investigations will be in cooperation with
our Afghan partners.
7. We presently have the momentum on the battlefield and should endeavor to
maintain it. In equal measure we must maintain the support of the Afghan people. We
must remember that ultimately the solution in this war will be political, not military
action. As such, we must always be cognizant of the consequences of our actions and
public perceptions. I have every confidence in the dedication and competence of the
members of our force to operate effectively within this challenging environment. Do
not hesitate to pursue the enemy, but stay true to the values of integrity and respect for
human life. Living these values distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher
endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. I direct this guidance to be briefed and
explained to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Civilian (including contractors)
of the force as soon as practical.69

appendix 2

2009 Tactical Directive—General McChrystal
Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan.
Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and will of the population.
Gaining and maintaining that support must be our overriding operational imperative—
and the ultimate objective of every action we take.
We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat
the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of Taliban
we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity—
the people. That means we must respect and protect the population from coercion and
violence—and operate in a manner which will win their support.
This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine the
outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy
forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic
defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the
people.
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue—
clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either side in this
struggle. The Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves.
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails
risk to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But
excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks.
We must understand this reality at every level in our force.
I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support
(CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian
casualties in accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using
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CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success
more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.
I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a more complex
battlefield will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and operate in accordance
with my intent. Following this intent requires a cultural shift within our forces—and
complete understanding at every level—down to the most junior soldiers. I expect
leaders to ensure this is clearly communicated and continually reinforced.
The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds
is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specific conditions
deleted due to operational security).
(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of
their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options
(specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter
the threat.
We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or execution of
combat operations. Therefore:
Any entry into an Afghan house should always be accompanied by Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and account for the
unique cultural sensitivities toward local women.
No ISAF forces will enter or fire upon, or fire into a mosque or any religious or
historical site except in self-defense. All searches and entries for any other reason will be
conducted by ANSF.
The challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and counterinsurgencies
are difficult to win. Nevertheless, we will win this war. I have every confidence in the
dedication and competence of the members of our force to operate effectively within this
challenging environment. Working together with our Afghan partners, we can overcome
the enemy’s influence and give the Afghan people what they deserve: a country at peace
for the first time in three decades, foundations of good governance, and economic
development.70

appendix 3

2010 Tactical Directive—General Petraeus
This directive applies to all ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) forces
operating under operational or tactical control . . . Subordinate commanders are not
authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.
Our counterinsurgency strategy is achieving progress in the face of tough enemies and
a number of other challenges. Concentrating our efforts on protecting the population
is having a significant effect. We have increased security in some key areas, and we have
reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces.
The Afghan population is, in a number of areas, increasingly supportive of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of coalition forces. We
have also seen support for the insurgency decrease in various areas as the number
of insurgent-caused civilian casualties has risen dramatically. We must build on this
momentum.
This effort is a contest of wills. Our enemies will do all that they can to shake our
confidence and the confidence of the Afghan people. In turn, we must continue to
demonstrate our resolve to the enemy. We will do so through our relentless pursuit of
the Taliban and others who mean Afghanistan harm, through our compassion for the
Afghan people, and through the example we provide to our Afghan partners.
We must continue—indeed, redouble—our efforts to reduce the loss of innocent
civilian life to an absolute minimum. Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause.
If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical
victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.
We must never forget that the center of gravity in this struggle is the Afghan people;
it is they who will ultimately determine the future of Afghanistan . . . Prior to the use of
fires, the commander approving the strike must determine that no civilians are present.
If unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fires are prohibited, except under of
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the following two conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security;
however, they have to do with the risk to ISAF and Afghan forces).
(NOTE) This directive, as with the previous version, does not prevent commanders
from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is
determined no other options are available to effectively counter the threat.
. . . Protecting the Afghan people does require killing, capturing, or turning the
insurgents. Indeed, as I noted earlier, we must pursue the Taliban tenaciously. But we
must fight with great discipline and tactical patience.
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimize loss of
innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces have
been striving to do that, and we will continue to do so.
In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a moral imperative both to protect
Afghan civilians and to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women in uniform
and the Afghan security forces with whom we are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder when
they are in a tough spot.
We must be consistent throughout the force in our application of this directive and
our rules of engagement. All commanders must reinforce the right and obligation of
self-defense of coalition forces, of our Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by
the rules of engagement.
We must train our forces to know and understand the rules of engagement and the
intent of the tactical directive. We must give our troopers the confidence to take all
necessary actions when it matters most, while understanding the strategic consequences
of civilian casualties. Indeed, I expect our troopers to exert their best judgment according
to the situation on the ground. Beyond that, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine
has my full support as we take the fight to the enemy.
. . . Partnering is how we operate. Some civilian casualties result from a misunderstanding
or ignorance of local customs and behaviors. No individuals are more attuned to the
Afghan culture than our Afghan partners. Accordingly, it is essential that all operations
be partnered with an ANSF unit and that our Afghan partners be part of the planning
and execution phases. Their presence will ensure greater situational awareness. It will
also serve to alleviate anxiety on the part of the local population and build confidence
in Afghan security forces.
I expect every operation and patrol to be partnered. If there are operational reasons
why partnership is not possible for a particular operation, the CONOP approval
authority must be informed . . .
Partnership is an essential aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. It is also an
indispensible element of the transition of security responsibility to ANSF.
Again, we need to build on the momentum we are achieving. I expect every trooper
and commander to use force judiciously, especially in situations where civilians may
be present. At the same time, we must employ all assets to ensure our troopers’ safety,
keeping in mind the importance of protecting the Afghan people as we do.
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This is a critical challenge at a critical time; but we must and will succeed. I expect that
everyone under my command, operational and tactical, will not only adhere to the letter
of this directive, but—more importantly—to its intent.
Strategic and operational commanders cannot anticipate every engagement. We have
no desire to undermine the judgment of tactical commanders. However, that judgment
should always be guided by my intent. Take the fight to the enemy. And protect the
Afghan people and help our Afghan partners defeat the insurgency.71

